What works and for whom: the Europeanisation of the Eastern Partnership countries and lessons for Belarus and the EU

This research was prepared within the framework of the Vitali Silitski Fellowship 2026 — a scholarship program by the Center for New Ideas designed to support young Belarusian researchers seeking to develop ideas inspired by the work of Vitali Silitski. The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Center for New Ideas.

Introduction

Geopolitical shifts in recent years have made EU policy towards the Eastern Partnership countries more proactive and concrete. The EU is offering increasingly specific tools for alignment, and the partner countries are more motivated to implement the necessary reforms, taking advantage of the window of opportunity opened up by the weakening of Russia’s influence in the region.

This paper examines three different examples of “Europeanisation” (convergence with EU law and standards): Moldova — the front-runner among the region’s candidate countries; Armenia — a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), which is actively reorienting itself towards the EU without formal candidate status; and Belarus — a country with which the EU lacks even a basic relationship agreement, but which is subject to sanctions and whose main partner is Russia. An analysis of these three cases makes it possible to assess which EU instruments for the Europeanisation of its eastern neighbours are effective, and how they are perceived in these countries. The author then draws specific lessons for Belarus’s future rapprochement with Europe, should favourable geopolitical and domestic political changes occur.

1. Moldova: a front-runner among EU accession candidates

For Moldova, the EU has become the most important trading and political partner in recent years. The country is the most integrated into existing EU programmes and instruments among its neighbours, the fastest in adapting the necessary reforms for EU accession^[1], and the most successful example of Europeanisation in the region.

The country achieved the opening of negotiations on two thematic clusters on the path to EU membership in June and July 2026^[2]. Moldova’s integration into the EU is not a dream, but a concrete, systemic process that is happening right now. The country’s residents have a positive attitude towards the EU (54.6% positive, 27.2% neutral, and only 14.2% negative), and 71% see their country’s relationship with a united Europe as good or very good.

The most recent parliamentary elections in September 2025 demonstrated not only the political will of the elites but also broader public support for the path to EU membership. However, the narrow margin of victory underlines the need for the systematic reform of the state apparatus and for changes in the socio-economic sphere that are tangible to the population^[3]. To this end, the EU implements a policy of supporting the country through regional programmes and financial instruments linked to reforms and aimed at the country’s development.

The first tangible result of closer ties with the EU for ordinary Moldovans was the introduction of visa-free travel in 2014. This step directly facilitated the social integration of Moldovans with the residents of EU member states: by May 2026, more than 2.7 million Moldovans had taken advantage of this opportunity and visited the EU^[4]. In 2026, Moldova became part of the EU roaming area and the SEPA banking transfer system, which reduced costs for residents and businesses and promotes transparency in money transfers whilst lowering the risks of corruption and fraud^[5].

The Association Agreement — including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) — signed in 2014, played a primary role in bringing the country closer to the EU. The parties established a free trade zone and laid the regulatory foundation for reforms and political association. It is worth noting that even businesses in Transnistria felt the positive impact of these changes and continue to benefit from the opportunities created to this day^[6].These documents became the foundation for Moldova’s integration into the EU market and the reduction of its dependence on Russia: from 25% of Moldova’s foreign trade in 2000 to 2.5% in 2024^[7].

One of the latest practical steps was the EU’s presentation of the “Moldova Economic Growth Plan” in October 2024^[8]. This unprecedented assistance instrument of €1.9 billion for 2025–2027 is linked to the “Reform Agenda” coordinated by the Government of Moldova and the European Commission and aimed at preparing for Moldova’s accession to the EU^[9]. The plan comprises grants (€385 million) and loans (€1.5 billion) for economic development and to accelerate reforms in economic competition and private sector development, energy, connectivity, and digitalisation, as well as “fundamental reforms” to combat corruption and reform the justice system, among other areas^[10]. Importantly, a large number of these reforms are directly linked to Europeanisation and the EU accession negotiations^[11].

The instrument represents a qualitative step forward and embodies the principle of earmarking — the conditional allocation of funds to specific reforms in designated sectors. Each tranche is politically sensitive, as the government is incentivised to implement reforms in a timely manner, and the public can see which sectors the funds are being invested in^[12]. The mechanism increases transparency and public trust in the investments and associated reforms, which every resident of the country can track via the “Reform and Growth Facility Scoreboard”^[13].

Image: Reform and Growth Facility Scoreboard, European Commission

As of June 2026, Moldova has received three tranches: €289 million in October 2025, related to the implementation of four key conditions in the energy sector (development of an open and competitive electricity market, ensuring competition in the domestic gas market and energy security) and the rule of law (progress on judicial reform and the protection of human rights)^[14]. A large proportion of the funds was directed towards direct support for citizens to compensate for rising energy prices. Investments went towards road repairs, the restoration of regional transport routes and railways, as well as salary supplements for young professionals, financial assistance for farmers and small entrepreneurs, the modernisation of schools, and environmental protection projects^[15].

In March 2026, the European Commission disbursed €189 million under the plan following Moldova’s implementation of 24 agreed reforms: reducing the administrative burden on businesses and the digitalisation of public and customs services increasing the financial transparency of the budget and implementing deep structural reforms of the justice system (transparency and digitalisation of the courts and external scrutiny of the ethics and finances of all the country’s judges and prosecutors)^[16], combating corruption (expanding the powers of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office and creating strict mechanisms for the confiscation of property and money acquired illegally); the launch of the national electricity market; and the scaling up of the use of renewable energy sources^[17]. These reforms are an example of structural “Europeanisation,” bringing the country closer to EU standards^[18].

Naturally, the process of fighting corruption and implementing reforms has not been without criticism of the Moldovan government^[19], which plays a certain role in the public perception of the transformation and Europeanisation of the system. However, the recent high-profile convictions of politicians involved in the theft of $1 billion from the banking sector in 2014–2015^[20] have had a positive impact on people’s perception of changes in the system. It is important for the EU to be unwavering in its position on building a transparent and democratic system, free from corruption and the political influence of the executive and legislative branches on the judiciary, and to continue to be guided by the principle of conditionality for financial support.

The funds received from the second tranche of the “Moldova Economic Growth Plan” are now being used to implement other major projects that are tangible for the population. These include the construction of a regional hospital in Bălți, expanding access to quality drinking water in the regions, developing the education system for children, providing allowances for young specialists, and funding additional nature conservation initiatives.

An important EU instrument, established at the request of the Moldovan government, was the EU Partnership Mission in Moldova and support through EU Rapid Response Teams for hybrid and digital challenges^[21]. These instruments helped the country to establish and develop the Centre for Strategic Communications and Countering Disinformation^[22],which played an important role in countering interference in the most recent parliamentary elections in 2025. This cooperation was made possible by the signing of the EU’s first Partnership for Security and Defence agreement with Moldova in 2024^[23].

Opportunities for exchange and cooperation through the Erasmus+ and Horizon programmes also play an important role in bringing Moldova closer to the EU: between 2014 and 2023, more than 3,300 Moldovans studied or taught in Europe, and between 2014 and 2020, 4,600 young people participated in exchange and volunteering projects^[24]. In 2021, Moldova signed an association agreement with Horizon Europe and participates in European research projects alongside EU member states^[25]. Students and researchers thus become additional bearers of shared European values and contribute to Moldova’s rapprochement with the EU.

2. Armenia: a reorientation towards Europeanisation under external pressure

The history of Armenia’s relationship with the EU is very different from that of Moldova. The country is not an EU accession candidate and is less integrated into its programmes. In 2013, when Moldova began its formal rapprochement with the EU, the Armenian leadership, under alleged pressure from Moscow, joined the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which slowed its rapprochement with the EU.

However, the earlier process of preparing an Association Agreement contributed to the signing of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with the EU, which entered into force in 2021^[26]. This document is similar in its depth to the Association Agreement, but does not include a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). It is a kind of “Trojan horse” — a foundation for closer alignment with the EU, covering political and administrative reforms, cooperation in the energy sector, environmental protection, and the improvement of the education system^[27]. Under the agreement, joint bodies exist — the Partnership Council and the Partnership Committee — which set the priorities for cooperation and reform.

It should be noted that, despite its strong dependence on Russia, Armenia pursued a policy of “silent Europeanisation” until relatively recently”^[28]. However, the geopolitical events of September 2023 — the war with Azerbaijan and Moscow’s disregard for its obligations towards Armenia — led Yerevan to openly deepen its relations with the EU^[29].

As of May 2026, 72% of Armenians support their country’s possible accession to the EU^[30]. On 7 June, Nikol Pashinyan’s pro-European party won the elections^[31]. Public support is linked to disillusionment with Russia, the success of public policy, the development of partnerships with the EU, and the tangible practical results of this cooperation. Recent examples include the holding of the European Political Community Summit in Yerevan, the first Armenia–EU Summit in June 2026, €50 million in assistance for Armenian businesses, and the practical facilitation of the reorientation of Armenia’s exports in response to trade restrictions and political pressure from Moscow^[32].

Among the reasons for Armenians’ increased trust in the EU is the success of the EU Civilian Observation Mission in Armenia, which has been operating since February 2023 on the Armenian side of the internationally recognised border with Azerbaijan^[33]. The Mission monitors the situation in the country’s border regions, contributing to the safety of local residents and upholding the ceasefire agreement^[34]. This instrument has become an important example of how the EU can play a stabilising role and act as a security partner for Armenia^[35].

In addition, the EU also helps to develop the Armenian armed forces through the European Peace Facility programme — without supplying weapons: €30 million in 2024–2026 for logistics, civil security, and the military’s compatibility with European standards^[36].

In April 2026, at the request of the Armenian government, the EU also deployed an EU Partnership Mission to support the resilience of the Armenian information space, governmental and electoral systems, and to counter external interference ahead of and during the parliamentary elections^[37]. The mission replicates the assistance provided to Moldova in 2025 and represents another success story of the EU’s foreign policy instruments.

Regarding the economic dimension of cooperation, within the Eastern Partnership initiative Armenia has access to the “Economic and Investment Plan,” whose main priorities for the country are developing connectivity, supporting small and medium-sized businesses and creating new jobs, and investing in the development of the digital and green economies. Through the EIB, Armenian businesses have received support totalling more than €220 million in recent years, supplemented by a new tranche of €100 million in October 2025^[38].

An important step in the development of Armenia’s relations with the EU was the adoption of a new “Strategic Agenda” in December 2025^[39]. Its main priority is Armenia’s integration into the trade network connecting the EU with Central Asia. In this way, the EU provides fresh impetus for the signing of peace agreements between Armenia and Azerbaijan and for Yerevan’s “Crossroads of Peace” initiative, aimed at normalising relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey and at regional integration^[40]. This support is enshrined in the “Armenia–EU Connectivity Partnership,” signed in May 2026, within the framework of the EU’s “Global Gateway” initiative^[41].

Among the specific projects being implemented is the construction of a new section of the Sisian–Kajaran road, the first customs terminal in the Syunik region, and a Customs and Logistics Centre in Yerevan to develop customs efficiency and transparency and improve services for businesses from third countries^[42]. Particular attention is being paid to the southern border region of Syunik: the joint “Sustainable Syunik” initiative has been supporting more than 40 projects for urban service improvement, socio-economic development, local infrastructure, and energy and environmental sustainability since January 2023, with a total value of €200 million^[43]. The initiative is an example of the EU’s “Global Gateway” strategy, under which the EU’s “Armenia Resilience and Growth Plan” for 2024–2027 aims to mobilise around €2.5 billion in investment.

The “Resilience and Growth Plan” is, in turn, reminiscent of the instrument the EU uses in relation to Moldova but represents less ambitious support in terms of its aims and scale. In April 2024, the EU planned to direct €270 million (€200 million in grants and €70 million in grants to attract investment) to the same priority areas of cooperation — connectivity, economic resilience and business development — and to the implementation of systemic reforms for alignment with the EU^[44]. The plan also provides for around €10 million to promote public participation in the country’s socio-political life through support for civil society and independent media^[45].

The country’s geographical situation differs significantly from Moldova’s, which is why it is important for the EU to maintain Armenia’s energy connectivity with the region: by increasing electricity transmission capacity with Georgia and connecting to regional projects such as the “Black Sea Cable”^[46].

The EU also pays great attention to helping with the integration of forcibly displaced persons from Nagorno-Karabakh — €78 million has been directed to relevant programmes since 2020^[47]. This undoubtedly has a positive impact on perceptions of the European Union, in stark contrast to Russia’s inaction during the crisis.

At the same time, the agenda includes questions of the partnership’s short- and medium-term goals, including the reform of the justice system and the state apparatus to further strengthen democracy, the human rights protection system, the rule of law, the separation of powers, and the independence of the judiciary.

The EU’s key priority in its policy towards Armenia is to avoid repeating the mistakes of its cooperation with Georgia — specifically, not backing down from strong demands for fundamental democratic reforms in pursuit of purely geopolitical interests. Monitoring must be carried out by independent NGOs, not by government-organised non-governmental organisations^[48]. Today, the country’s civil society notes the limited opportunities for monitoring the reform process, which must remain on the EU’s agenda in its relations with the Armenian government^[49].

As in the case of Moldova, it is important to be guided by the principle of conditionality of support, strongly linked to reforms for the consolidation of democracy, the building of an independent judiciary, transparent anti-corruption efforts, the overcoming of societal polarisation, and the improvement of the human rights situation^[50]. In addition to a combination of funding and stricter political conditionality for its provision, it is also necessary to offer new prospects for Armenia’s rapprochement with the EU^[51].

Special attention should be paid, for example, to the Visa Liberalisation Dialogue — one of the most tangible instruments for the population. In May 2026, Armenia received its “First Action Plan” and is actively advancing reforms in this area with Brussels support of €2.2 million^[52].

Another priority is the process of socialisation, which is ensured by the participation of students and researchers in Erasmus+ exchange programmes (3,500 participants since 2021) and scientific cooperation under Horizon Europe (around €8 million in support since 2022)^[53].

3. Belarus: the experience of Europeanisation and democratisation

The EU’s strategy towards Belarus, the country’s domestic political situation, and the history of its relationship development differ significantly from the cases of Moldova and Armenia. Today, the geopolitical and domestic political situation does not favour the normalisation and Europeanisation of Belarus. Brussels maintains a strategy of sanctions and diplomatic pressure on the government whilst simultaneously supporting civil society: since 2020, aid to independent media, NGOs, and human rights organisations has reached €200 million^[54].

The strategy, however, had an exception — the period of “critical engagement,” when sectoral cooperation between the EU and Belarus developed. This cannot be called democratisation or Europeanisation: the EU navigated a space lacking even a basic agreement on relations with Minsk, let alone an Association Agreement (as with Moldova) or a Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (as with Armenia)^[55]. The 2016–2020 period of engagement played a significant role in bringing Belarusian society closer to the EU, particularly through “socialisation” — something that is sorely lacking today.

From 2016, technical assistance doubled: the EU allocated €28–30 million annually, and this support could have increased significantly had the Belarusian side been interested in implementing reforms and in closer alignment with the EU^[56]. The EU held a dialogue and provided assistance on implementing domestic economic reforms in connection with Belarus’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and in other areas, including through the TAIEX and Twinning projects for experience-sharing between public authorities^[57].

Significant funding was also provided for regional and cross-border cooperation, aimed at inclusivity, environmental protection, and local economic development: in 2014–2017, Belarus received up to €89 million under the “Indicative Programme for the Support of Belarus”^[58]. In 2017, Belarus joined the cross-border cooperation programmes “Poland–Belarus–Ukraine” and “Latvia–Lithuania–Belarus,” making over €282 million available to the country by 2020^[59]. Programmes were also implemented under the Eastern Partnership on energy efficiency and the environment.^[60] Belarus gained access to funds from the EBRD (€390 million) and the EIB (€530 million) for the development of transport infrastructure, customs border crossings, the modernisation of water supply systems, and the development of small and medium-sized enterprises^[61].

The signing of the Agreement on the Facilitation of the Issuance of Visa with the EU in 2020 was a symbolic and practically tangible instrument for the residents of Belarus^[62]. The agreement remains in force today, but the number of visas is limited by the state of diplomatic relations and the geopolitical reality: in 2025, around 152,000 Belarusians received a Schengen visa, whereas in 2019 this figure reached 640,000^[63]. Other specific EU instruments covered education and exchange programmes: between 2015 and 2020, more than 3,000 students and lecturers participated in Erasmus+; 5,500 professionals took part in short-term professional exchanges; and 3,400 young professionals and activists participated in volunteer programmes and training. The MOST mobility programme, with total funding of around €5 million, was also in operation, aimed at civil society representatives and public servants. 48 Horizon scientific cooperation projects brought around €7 million in funding to Belarusian research centres^[64].

Although the government did not approach European standards, cooperation with the EU brought practical results and brought the Belarusian people closer to the EU through active work with civil society, simplified mobility, educational and professional opportunities, support for business, and infrastructure and environmental projects. Brussels consistently invested in human capital and infrastructure development. This accumulated experience and these people are the foundation for bringing Belarus closer to the EU, should positive changes occur in the region and the country.

4. Belarus: conclusions and recommendations on Europeanisation

The experience of Moldova and Armenia provides concrete examples of countries’ reorientation and highlights possible lessons for Belarus’s future rapprochement with the EU. These examples demonstrate that the EU is a partner capable of promoting the Europeanisation of neighbouring countries, pushing them towards systemic reforms and linking its financial and practical assistance to this.

For Belarus, the challenges are linked not only to the need for internal transformation but also to external decoupling from Russian integration blocs^[65]. The risks are higher due to greater structural dependence on Russia, which will directly generate additional threats to transition stability and require financial and practical assistance from the EU^[66].

Existing research proposes a transitional period that could be based on a CEPA-type agreement — similar to Armenia’s — in order to align economic standards and implement reforms. After this, a transition to an Association Agreement and formal EU accession negotiations, as in Moldova’s case, becomes possible. To avoid a deep crisis, a strategy of gradual decoupling without an economic shock is needed, involving the sequential reorientation of trade and investment, and the adaptation of the system to EU standards. Under favourable conditions, such a reorientation could take 10–15 years.

It is important to note that the EU has already prepared an “Economic Assistance Plan for a Democratic Belarus” totalling up to €3 billion in grants and loans, aimed at supporting the Belarusian economy, implementing democratic reforms, energy sustainability and transformation, and long-term investments in transport infrastructure and innovation^[67]. A new “Resilience and Growth Plan” for Belarus, similar to the one for Moldova, will be an important tool in the EU’s strategy, which must be grounded in the EU’s existing practice whilst taking into account the specificities of the Belarusian context. Regional experience shows that even under pressure from Russia, countries are capable of defending the independence of their foreign policy choices, aligning with the EU, and implementing necessary reforms.

Conditioning financial support on reforms appears to be a key element of the EU’s strategy. Financial assistance for building independent institutions and reforming the system is a tool the EU has deployed with its eastern neighbours and must use for Belarus as well^[68]. The implementation of reforms can be facilitated by the participation of the Belarusian side in TAIEX and Twinning projects with EU member states and Eastern European partners within the framework of the “Eastern Partnership,” which Moldova and Armenia actively utilise.

The EU also needs to pursue a policy of “socialisation” of the Belarusian people in order to bring society closer to Europe^[69]. To this end, an important initial step following normalisation should be accelerated work on the visa regime, following the example of Armenia, and the reintegration of Belarusians into the EU’s educational space by restoring the Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe programmes and continuing MOST^[70]. At a later stage of the development of relations, Belarus must also be connected to the European roaming system and the single bank transfer system, following the example of Moldova, and become a beneficiary of the mechanisms of so-called “EU gradual integration.”

Today, it is necessary to continue cooperation with Belarusian civil society and independent media that work with audiences inside the country. It is also important to clearly distinguish between the population and the Belarusian authorities, including by facilitating people-to-people contacts and conducting a strategic communications campaign. The latter must better convey to the Belarusian people the EU’s position regarding their country, as well as the opportunities the European Union offers today, and the prospects for future cooperation with Belarus.^[71]