This research was prepared as part of the Vitali Silitski Fellowship — a fellowship program by the Center for New Ideas supporting young Belarusian researchers who seek to advance ideas inspired by the work of Vitali Silitski. The views expressed by the author(s) do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Center for New Ideas.
Introduction
Despite its complicity in Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine and the total suppression of civil liberties within the country, Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s regime has managed to achieve a partial diplomatic thaw with the US and the lifting of a number of sanctions without addressing the root causes that led to their imposition. Over the past year, more than 500 political prisoners have been pardoned; however, this process has been accompanied by the immediate deportation of many of those released, who have been left without means of subsistence or identity documents. At the same time, the repressive machinery within the country shows no sign of stopping — the system is rapidly replenishing its exchange pool with new arrests, whilst the human rights situation remains consistently dire.
For democratic forces and Western countries, such a bargain amounts to a strategic defeat. The softening of the US stance comes against a backdrop where the Belarusian military-industrial complex continues to actively supply the Russian army, whilst the country’s territory is being used for escalating hybrid aggression that threatens the security of NATO states. The European Union, recognising these risks, is maintaining a tough sanctions regime and imposing stricter conditions for dialogue, which largely offsets the economic impact of the US concessions.
This gives rise to an analytical paradox: why, in the absence of guaranteed economic benefits and whilst a strict European embargo remains in place, does the regime continue to cling to the American diplomatic track, releasing even the most prominent and dangerous (from a symbolic point of view) political opponents? To answer this question and understand the underlying logic driving Minsk to resort to such extraordinary measures, it is necessary to analyse the nature of the system’s survival.
The concept of preventive authoritarianism
To better understand the resilience of Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s political regime, one must turn to the concept of “preventive authoritarianism,” introduced by the Belarusian political scientist and sociologist Vitali Silitski[1]. This concept involves the constant launching of pre-emptive strikes to stifle or destroy any potential centres of consolidation among those dissatisfied with the authorities, even before they can develop into a real political, organisational, or street-level threat[2].
The aim of this policy is to instil in the political opposition and broad sections of society a sense of profound hopelessness and the impossibility of political change, even if the authoritarian regime holds a genuine majority and is highly likely to defeat any opposition in a fair contest[3].
Silitski identified three instruments at which preventive authoritarianism operates: the tactical, the institutional, and the cultural[4].
The first manifests itself in the continuous repression of opposition politicians, independent journalists, human rights defenders, and civil society activists, particularly in the run-up to major electoral campaigns or potential protests. The second involves rewriting laws in such a way as to criminalise the very essence of independent civic engagement — which need not necessarily be political or social in nature. For example, tightening the rules for the self-employed is just as much a tool of pre-emptive control as a ban on independent opinion polls or the regular expansion of the list of “extremist materials”. The third instrument, cultural preemption, is working on public consciousness: planting ideas about the opposition and about democracy itself, whilst simultaneously constructing a counter-narrative of “regime patriotism” in response.
Preventive authoritarianism counters not only internal but also external threats. Faced with the phenomenon of “colour revolutions” — where a successful democratic breakthrough in some countries (Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, Kyrgyzstan in 2005) in the age of information technology inevitably created the conditions for and reinforced public demand for democratisation in neighbouring, less democratic states — many autocracies, including Belarus, perceived this as a serious threat to their very existence.[5]
Silitski noted that regimes had come to realise that their survival increasingly depended on the failure of democracies abroad. This led to the formation of the so-called “authoritarian international” — an informal alliance of undemocratic regimes in the post-Soviet space, spearheaded by Russia and Belarus[6]. Within this framework, Russia provided political, informational, and financial support to allied autocracies, whilst organisations such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) were used to legitimise rigged elections and counter Western influence[7].
Silitski noted that, despite cooperating with like-minded regimes to counter threats from democracies, preventive authoritarianism in Belarus may also, to a limited extent, defend itself against the influence of allied autocracies. At the same time, Silitsky did not identify an ideological ally as the main threat within the prevention model itself: in his framework, Russia remains a patron and partner in the suppression of democratisation, whilst he analysed the conflict between Minsk and Moscow as a separate empirical case.
Paradoxically, the Lukashenka regime, for all its anti-Western rhetoric and total repression of pro-democratic forces within the country, perceives the de jure and de facto allied regime in Russia as a more serious threat to its very existence.
An important caveat: this refers specifically to the regime’s existence as a separate political entity. The scale of repression against its own citizens is incomparably greater than that against those who promote Russian interests; it is therefore necessary, before proceeding with the analysis, to distinguish between the different threats as perceived by the Lukashenka regime.
- Pro-democratic forces — the main threat to the regime’s hold on power within the country, but one which is inherently weaker than the regime in terms of resources and capabilities, and which is subject to Belarusian law as an internal actor within the state. In the event of a change of power following an opposition victory, a complete replacement or absorption of the entire regime apparatus — which has existed for over 30 years — seems unlikely even in the long term.
- Russia — the greatest threat to the very existence of the regime as a separate entity. Russia and its elites possess incomparably greater resources and capabilities than the Belarusian opposition and the Lukashenka regime combined. Russia can impose its own legal framework on Belarus and cannot be suppressed by the regime’s repressive measures. Unlike Chechnya, Belarus is not viewed by Moscow as a culturally and socially alien territory in which the retention of local personnel is necessary to ensure governability.
To demonstrate this, it is necessary to examine both the initial and current stages throughout the history of interaction between the Belarusian and Russian regimes following the collapse of the USSR, as well as to briefly analyse the overall picture of the evolution of preventive authoritarianism in Belarus from 1994 to 2026. The analysis provides an opportunity to expand Silitsky’s model in a dimension that he did not formalise[8]: — namely, the clearer limits of preventive authoritarianism in Belarus and its vulnerabilities, as tested in practice, which became apparent precisely in the conflict with its ideological ally and patron.
The evolution of preventive authoritarianism
Phase I: The establishment of Lukashenka’s regime and his “sworn friendship” with Russia (1994–1999)
After coming to power in 1994, Lukashenka initiated the suppression of the national-democratic opposition, including the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF). The majority of the population still clung to Soviet forms of identity and were also concerned about the country’s dire criminal and economic situation — the consequences of the collapse of the USSR[9]. The state consolidated society through a new social contract: political and economic stability and security in exchange for support for Lukashenka’s policies and a renunciation of any attempts to revise them[10].
The system of checks and balances was completely dismantled following the 1996 referendum, which allowed all political powers to be concentrated in the hands of the executive branch[11]. At the same time, key opponents of the regime were physically eliminated. In foreign policy, the regime actively promoted the idea of creating the Union State (1999): against the backdrop of the weakening position of Russia’s first president, Boris Yeltsin, Lukashenka hoped to use integration as a springboard to assume a leadership role in the unified state[12]. However, Yeltsin’s chosen successor turned out to be Vladimir Putin, who was aware of Lukashenka’s political ambitions and has since continued to pragmatically use the idea of integration against him.
Phase II: The two-vector pendulum of prevention (2000–2014)
The change of leadership in Russia in 2000 and the growing pragmatism of relations under Putin forced Minsk to devise a balancing strategy. Domestically, the regime stepped up preventive measures in response to the risks of “colour revolutions.” In 2005, Article 193-1 of the Criminal Code was introduced, establishing liability for the activities of unregistered organisations[13]. The Ministry of Justice carried out a mass closure of civil society organisations[14] (Viasna’, the largest human rights organisation, had its registration revoked in 2003 and has faced repeated rejections ever since; by the early 2010s, the Belarusian Helsinki Committee remained the only registered human rights organisation at the republican level — under constant threat of dissolution[15]). Any organisational activity by the pro-democratic opposition was pre-emptively paralysed, whilst the protests of 2006 and 2010 were brutally suppressed.
Foreign policy swung like a pendulum: the regime traded temporary domestic political liberalisation for loans and a softening of the West’s sanctions rhetoric, whilst simultaneously selling its status as Moscow’s strategic outpost[16]. Key measures to counter Moscow’s influence included blocking attempts by the Russian oligarchy to privatise strategic enterprises (such as Belaruskali or MZKT — the Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant), preventing the official registration of pro-Russian political parties and movements, and Minsk’s refusal to recognise Abkhazia’s independence in 2008 following Russia’s invasion of Georgia[17].
Phase III: The Ukrainian crisis, control of “grey zones,” and the shift of the prevention pendulum towards Russia (2014–2019)
The crisis in Ukraine (2014) heightened fears regarding Russia: due to the annexation of Crimea by Russian forces, the creation of unrecognised republics in the Ukrainian Donbas, and the intensification of Russian imperialist rhetoric towards certain neighbours and Western countries, the Lukashenka regime came to view the Russian Federation increasingly as an existential threat to Belarus’s sovereignty[18]. As a defensive measure, Minsk initiated a “soft Belarusisation,” restricting the activities of pro-Russian media outlets (the “Regnum” case)[19].
Guided by observations of the protests and unrest in Ukraine — organised by both supporters and opponents of the country’s pro-Russian former president, Viktor Yanukovych — the Belarusian security services refocused their preventive surveillance on apolitical, economically independent social groups. Decree No. 3 (“on social parasites”) made it possible to bring citizens in the informal economy under fiscal supervision[20]. The tightening of Article 328 of the Criminal Code (anti-narcotics legislation) led to the mass imprisonment for long terms of young people who were potentially active ahead of future elections[21]. However, these measures politicised the neutral majority, provoking the 2017 protests and the creation of the “Mothers-328” movement[22].
Preventive measures against pro-democratic forces eased but remained in place. A striking example is the “White Legion” case, which demonstrated the Lukashenka regime’s concerns about Belarusian citizens who had gained combat experience in Ukraine or were in any way connected to the Ukrainian armed forces[23].
Phase IV: Coronavirus, Wagner, elections, war, and the failure of preventive authoritarianism (2020–2024)
The country’s leadership’s denial of the scale of the COVID-19 pandemic and its cover-up of the high mortality rate from the virus became yet another factor in the breakdown of the social contract between society and the authorities. Against the backdrop of deliberate inaction by the authorities — who were unwilling to face the economic losses resulting from the imposition of lockdowns — society moved towards even greater self-organisation (initiatives such as ByCovid19).
A particular manifestation of preventive authoritarianism in relation to Russian influence was the arrest of Wagner Group mercenaries during the 2020 presidential campaign and state propaganda’s accusations against the Russian Federation of interfering in the elections.
However, the Lukashenka regime’s pre-emptive strike against all opposition presidential candidates — whom the regime publicly labelled as either pro-Russian or pro-Western puppets — succeeded in temporarily blurring the ideological and social differences between the “freeloaders” of 2017, activists from the “Mothers-328” movement, those dissatisfied with the government’s handling of the coronavirus, factory workers, the pro-Russian middle class, and the pro-Western, nationally-oriented intelligentsia. Decentralised networks of public discontent with the authorities, particularly via the Telegram messaging app, broke through the “spiral of silence,” mobilising hundreds of thousands of people to vote against Lukashenka and subsequently to take part in peaceful marches — unprecedented in the country’s history — against the rigging of the election results.
Having realised the scale of the collapse of preventive authoritarianism, the regime was able to retain power solely through mass violence and repression by the security forces against protesting citizens. To sustain and finance such measures, as well as to consolidate its position within the state apparatus, it needed a stable external sponsor and a clearly defined external enemy.
On the one hand, the unprecedented violence of the first days of the protests made Minsk utterly toxic for Western democracies, ruling out the possibility of financial or other support from them, even if the regime had continued to accuse Russia of interfering in the elections. On the other hand, a hypothetical pivot towards the West would inevitably have crossed the Kremlin’s “red lines” and carried the existential risk of Russian military intervention. Consequently, aligning with Moscow and designating the West as the primary external enemy became the only viable option for Lukashenka’s regime to physically retain power and secure financial aid.
Following the brutal suppression of the protests in autumn 2020, the system underwent a fundamental psychological transformation. Cold and calculated preventive authoritarianism was replaced by blind, reactive, and total terror. Absolutely all independent NGOs (including environmental, charitable, and animal welfare organisations) were forcibly dissolved, and the media landscape was completely purged[24]. A system of trials “in absentia” was put in place, involving the confiscation of property from anyone accused of or suspected of participating in protests. The security forces introduced the practice of mass mobile phone checks at the border, sentencing citizens to years in prison for “likes,” comments, and subscriptions to non-state Telegram channels deemed “extremist” by the regime»[25]. It has become commonplace for private companies to be required to create posts for in-house ideologists and to conduct “preventive talks” with staff, reporting citizens deemed disloyal to the regime to the security forces.
In foreign policy, Minsk was forced to cede even more of its sovereignty to Moscow. The Wagner Group members who had been detained as a preventive measure against Russia were released immediately after the elections; in 2021, Belarus signed 28 integration agreements with Russia and launched a joint operation to provoke a migration crisis on the eastern borders of the EU and NATO. In 2022, the country’s territory was made available to the Russian Armed Forces for a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, and later an agreement was reached on the deployment in Belarus of Russian “Oreshnik” systems and tactical nuclear weapons[26]. As a result, Belarus’s military sovereignty found itself in severe strategic dependence on Russia[27].
Несмотря на это, режим Лукашенко продолжал (но ограниченно) применять превентивные и реактивные меры в отношении российского влияния:
Despite this, the Lukashenka regime continued (albeit to a limited extent) to take preventive and reactive measures against Russian influence:
- a ban on the registration of the pro-Russian “Soyuz” party;[28]
- the detention of pro-Russian activists within the country (for example, the cases of Volha Bondareva, Artem Agafonov, and Elvira Mirsalimova);[29]
- bans on pro-Russian ideological events — in particular, the “Immortal Regiment”;[30]
- incidents involving the interception and destruction of Russian military drones by Belarusian air defense forces in the country’s airspace.[31]
Phase V: An attempt to restore the geopolitical balance (2025–2026)
Faced with heightened risks of being directly drawn into a conflict against Ukraine or NATO countries, Minsk attempted to restore the geopolitical balance. Political prisoners were transformed into an exchange pool to sustain negotiations and ease the sanctions regime.
The pragmatic approach of the new US administration, focused primarily on economic interests[32], enabled Minsk to secure its first successful deals in 2025. In exchange for the release of political prisoners, the Donald Trump administration lifted sanctions against Belavia, Belaruskali, and several key Belarusian banks[33]. The US also initiated consultations with the EU on resuming the transit of Belarusian potash fertilisers. It is noteworthy that on 20 January 2026, Lukashenko became the first European politician to sign a document joining the US-led “Board of Peace” initiative[34] (Donald Trump’s attempt to create an international dialogue platform as an alternative to the UN). Belarus joined the organisation as a founding member under the terms of a three-year unpaid mandate[35], whilst failing to pay the $1 billion admission fee[36]. This rushed move to join, coupled with Russia’s refusal to participate in the initiative, allowed the Lukashenka regime to create the appearance of foreign policy autonomy[37].
At the same time, signals from Minsk regarding a desire for détente with the West contrast with the extent of Belarus’s involvement in hybrid attacks on European NATO members. In Poland alone, around 30,000 attempts to illegally cross the border from Belarus were recorded in 2025 — nearly the same as in 2024[38]. At the same time, Poland recorded acts of sabotage on its railways and cyber-attacks on its water supply systems and energy sector; Polish authorities attribute these incidents to the Russian secret services, whilst Belarus’s involvement is considered to provide transit routes and hideouts for those committing the attacks[39]. On 9 September 2025, a large group of Russian drones carried out an unprecedented incursion into Polish airspace via Belarus[40]. . Simultaneously, mass launches of unmanned, smuggled balloons from Belarusian territory regularly paralysed Lithuanian airports[41].
Against the backdrop of a diplomatic thaw between the Trump and Lukashenka administrations, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Ukraine, on the contrary, stepped up the construction of defensive fortifications, as well as the deployment of mines and drones along their borders with Belarus[42].
Conclusion and recommendations
The history of the evolution of preventive authoritarianism in Belarus has laid bare its structural limitations, which over time have either been partially resolved, exacerbated, or remained unchanged:
- Inflexibility in the face of digital networks: the bureaucratic apparatus, geared towards eliminating traditional parties and political movements, proved vulnerable to decentralised civil mobilisation in 2020. This vulnerability was largely remedied through ongoing mass political repression.
- The politicisation of the apolitical: the constant broadening of the scope of what the authorities consider a “threat” — particularly without clear justification or warning — means that persecution begins to affect youth subcultures, politically neutral self-employed individuals, and members of certain professional communities. As a result, the state itself drives the moderate and passive majority towards various strands of opposition sentiment (be they pro-Western, strictly pro-national, or pro-Russian in nature). Preventive authoritarianism, in its quest to survive and defend itself against any threats — not just genuine democratisation — cannot single out just one specific group or social stratum as its enemy; this will invariably expand the circle of the regime’s opponents beyond those it originally regarded as a threat.
- A significant loss of sovereignty: the model of preventive authoritarianism always requires colossal resources to sustain its functions. The disruption of the social and geopolitical balance in Belarus after 2020 — due to the flaws and contradictions inherent in the very model of preventive authoritarianism — has led to a fatal economic and military dependence on the Russian Federation, which can no longer be rolled back to pre-2020 levels through preventive or reactive authoritarian measures alone.
The events of 2025–2026 confirm the lack of internal resources within Lukashenka’s regime to resist Russian influence and the Kremlin’s geopolitical plans regarding Western countries, which threaten the stability of the regime itself. Lukashenka seeks to maintain diplomatic channels with the current US administration in order to pre-empt a scenario of complete political absorption by Russia, which the regime considers unacceptable. At the same time, the regime endeavours to present this scenario in negotiations with Western countries as an even greater threat to them — but one which Belarus, should the West refuse to meet it halfway, could allegedly embrace voluntarily without any significant risk to its own sovereignty. This is done in order to circumvent Western (primarily European) demands for the democratisation of Belarus, an end to repression, and a cessation of support for Russia through the military-industrial complex.
In light of the above, any official delegation from the US or the EU conducting negotiations with Minsk should rethink its approach to threats of deepening Belarusian-Russian integration. The Lukashenka regime fears this scenario far more than it is willing to admit, and is far more interested in the very fact of negotiations with the West — as a demonstration of its autonomy to Moscow — than it is willing to acknowledge. Zero susceptibility to such threats from Minsk — and even a counter-threat to withdraw entirely from any negotiations with it — can create a stronger incentive for the regime to make concessions than any reciprocal easing of pressure: as things currently stand, losing the negotiating track itself costs Minsk more than meeting Western demands on irregular migration, violations of NATO members’ airspace, supplies to Russia’s defence industry, and domestic repression. The same holds for those positions the regime has so far treated as non-negotiable.
Risks
A compelling objection can be raised against the proposed approach: a hard line and a refusal to make concessions will push Lukashenka even closer to Moscow, to the point of the country entering the war — and the West will get exactly what it fears. The objection sounds convincing, but it must be tested against the facts — and the facts refute it.
The attached timeline of five episodes covering the period 2022–2026 (see appendix) highlights the observed asymmetry: in all five cases the greater the actual pressure and the risk of being drawn in, the lower Minsk’s actual escalation — whilst its rhetoric remains consistently strident. The northern front in Ukraine in 2022, the strike on the Russian A-50 aircraft at Machulishchy in 2023, the Ukrainian campaign in the Kursk region in 2024, the incursion of Russian drones into Polish airspace in 2025, Zelenskyy’s ultimatum regarding relay transmitters in 2026 — on each occasion, external pressure mounted, whilst Minsk responded not with escalation but with evasion: it shot down Russian drones over its own territory, passed on air situation data to Poland and Lithuania in advance, switched off the relay transmitters at Kyiv’s request, and publicly reprimanded the Russian ambassador. Under pressure, the regime is not “falling into Moscow’s orbit” — it is evading being drawn in, because for it, war is the ultimate absorption by Russia, not protection from the West.
Hence the straightforward conclusion: the threat “if you push me too far, I’ll go to Putin” is a bluff. Minsk is already largely under Moscow’s control by its own reckoning, and “I’ll proceed further” is not a contingency plan but a negotiating tool with which the regime extracts concessions from the West. We should therefore proceed on the assumption that the regime is capable of meeting demands until proven otherwise, and the burden of proof regarding its own helplessness lies with the regime, not with the West. The shutdown of the relay transmitters within a week demonstrated that the “cornered” regime still possesses the capacity to act in spite of its dependence on Russia. Minsk’s references to a “hopeless situation” should not be regarded as a mitigating circumstance.
The regime’s complicity in the 2022 invasion — the providing of territory, infrastructure and airspace — remains the greatest extent of its involvement throughout the entire war, and this occurred at a time when the pressure was coming not from the West or Ukraine, but from Russia, whose troops were already deployed in the country. Yet even at that point, the Belarusian army was not involved at any stage of the northern front’s existence. The distinction between providing infrastructure and entering the war constitutes the essence of the observed asymmetry: under direct coercion from its ally, the regime conceded everything except the one thing that would have made it a full-fledged party to the war.
Zero susceptibility to blackmail is not the same as a complete refusal to engage in dialogue: firm demands must go hand in hand with specific conditions — the release of political prisoners without further arrests, and an end to airspace violations and hybrid aggression, without attempts to replace them with forms of the same actions that are less visible to the West.[43]